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The law of emotional distress is characterized by judicial reluctance to create and expand remedies for
emotional injuries. The issue here is whether the Court's decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul will impose
further limitations on the right to recover civil damages for the intentional infliction of emotional injury,
particular emotional injuries resulting from hate speech. This symposium first examines the applicability of
the tort to redress claims based on abusive epithets based on the victim's race, gender, or sexual orientation.
The symposium then argues that using this tort in cases involving hate speech should not create constitutional
problems, absent a collision with First Amendment interests established by the Supreme Court in the
defamation cases; and that R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul should have no impact on emotional distress claims based
on hate speech.
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CIVIL ACfIONS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND 
R.A. V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL 
MICHAEL K. STEENSONt 
The law of emotional distress is characterized by judicial re-
luctance to create and expand remedies for emotional injuries. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress has proceeded along content-neutral 
grounds. I In general, the law has developed free from First 
Amendment considerations, except for the Supreme Court's 
decision in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,2 where the Court applied 
the First Amendment limitations developed in defamation 
cases to limit recovery by public figures or officials for the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The issue here is whether the Court's decision in R.A. V. v. 
City of St. Paul 3 will impose further limitations on the right to 
recover civil damages for the intentional infliction of emotional 
injury. I take the position that it should not. 
Before analyzing the constitutional issues involved in deter-
mining whether recovery will be allowed for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, I will first examine the 
applicability of the tort to redress claims based on abusive epi-
thets based on the victim's race, gender, or sexual orientation. 
Section 46 of the Restatement sets forth a general theory of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress: "One who by ex-
treme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liabil-
ity for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
results from it, for such bodily harm."4 Section 46 has been 
applied in a wide variety of situations. On occasion, it has 
t Margaret H. and James E. Kelley Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, 
St. Paul, Minnesota. B.S. 1967, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1971, University of 
Iowa. 
l. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984); 
see also Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in Minnesota, 19 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). 
2. 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988). 
3. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). 
983 
HeinOnline -- 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 984 1992
984 WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 18 
been applied to permit recovery for racial epithets.5 Whether 
section 46 provides a workable civil action to redress the inju-
ries caused by hate speech is a different question, however. 
The standards the courts have applied to limit recovery in 
cases involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
are relatively rigid, making recovery under any circumstances 
difficult. That factor, along with the availability of other alter-
natives, such as civil rights or human rights act claims,6 may 
account for the limited number of cases involving claims for 
emotional distress based on abusive racial epithets.7 
Professor Richard Delgado has advocated a separate tort for 
racial insults to redress the special problems that exist in cases 
where one person intends to demean another by the use of 
racial epithets. Delgado's proposed theory would require the 
plaintiff to prove the following: "Language was addressed to 
him or her by the defendant that was intended to demean 
through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as in-
tended to demean through reference to race; and that a rea-
sonable person would recognize as a racial insult."8 The 
theory is based in part on a recognition of the peculiar harm 
5. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); Gomez v. 
Hug, 645 P.2d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); White v. Monsanto Co., 570 So. 2d 221 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990). 
6. In Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that while the Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.15 
(1990), did not expressly abrogate battery claims arising from the same conduct giv-
ing rise to claims under the Act, a plaintiff could not achieve a double recovery for 
the same harm. The plaintiff's recovery under the Human Rights Act for sexual har-
assment therefore precluded recovery for the same damages for battery. As applied 
to emotional distress claims, recovery under the Human Rights Act would preclude 
recovery for racial or sexual epithets causing severe emotional distress. 
7. See, e.g., Dawson v. Zayre Dept. Stores, 499 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(granting motion to dismiss because racial epithet uttered during course of dispute 
between store customer and employee was insufficient to state a claim for emotional 
distress absent aggravating circumstances). The court relied on comment (d) to 
§ 46, which states: 
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our 
society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime 
plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a 
certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely 
inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in 
every case where some one's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom 
to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left 
through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (1965). 
8. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Actionfor Racial Insults, Epithets, and 
Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 179 (1982). 
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that racial invective causes to targeted individuals. The lower 
threshold is justified because of the savage inequalities that 
make racial invective particularly harmful. The same argu-
ments that justify the theory as applied to racial epithets could 
also be applied to invective based on a person's gender, sexual 
orientation, or religion. 
There are obvious practical problems with the theory. It 
deviates to a significant degree from the requirements of sec-
tion 46 of the Restatement and would permit recovery with a 
lesser showing than that required by section 46. Courts that 
have attempted to hold the line against a barrage of claims 
under section 46 are unlikely to adopt a theory that seems to 
lower the guidelines developed to resolve emotional distress 
claims. 
If Delgado's theory is rejected because of concerns about its 
distance from the requirements of section 46 and the conse-
quent inability of judges to keep the theory in check, section 46 
itself may be adapted to impose civil liability in hate speech 
cases in a way that permits redress of injuries caused by hate 
speech. This remedy will recognize the peculiar nature of the 
harm that racial invective causes, but with limitations that do 
not exist under the Delgado theory. 
Section 46 requires extreme and outrageous conduct. The 
guideline is general. In Minnesota, to be extreme and outra-
geous, a defendant's conduct must be "utterly intolerable to 
the civilized community."g There are various ways of satisfying 
that standard, including a showing that the defendant took ad-
vantage of a peculiar susceptibility on the part of the plaintiff, 
abused a power relationship, or engaged in a pattern of harass-
ment. Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is a ques-
tion for the court in the first instance. lO 
Whether "hate speech" meets the standard depends on the 
circumstances. It could be argued that the circumstances are 
sufficiently aggravated in any case where a defendant in ten-
9. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 439 (Minn. 1983). 
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. h (1965), states: 
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the de-
fendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outra-
geous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where 
reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the 
court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been 
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. 
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tionally uses language directed toward the plaintiff because of 
the plaintiff's race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or dis-
ability, similar to the hate crimes statutes that enhance criminal 
penalties when the defendant's motivation for an assault, tres-
pass, or other crime is based on "the victim's or another's ac-
tual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
disability ... or national origin. "II 
The hate crimes statutes take a strong position against bias-
motivated criminal conduct. The state policy embedded in 
those statutes is transferable to civil claims for emotional dis-
tress, even if it does not result in a per se finding of civilliabil-
ity where the defendant's conduct or verbal assault directed to 
the plaintiff is based on the identified characteristics. At the 
very least, it should make summary judgment on the outra-
geous conduct issue correspondingly more difficult to grant, 12 
and, with a better understanding of the impact of bias-moti-
II. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.595, subd. 2(b) (1990), which states: 
Whoever intentionally causes damage to another person's physical property 
without the other person's consent because of the property owner's or an-
other's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disa-
bility as defined in section 363.01, age, or national origin may be sentenced 
to imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not 
more than $3,000, or both, if the damage reduces the value of the property 
by not more than $250. 
MINN. STAT. § 609.2231, subd. 4(a) (1990), states: 
Whoever assaults another because of the victim's or another's actual or per-
ceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in 
section 363.0 I, age, or national origin may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, 
or both. 
12. One problem with a legally automatic conclusion that any epithet based on 
certain characteristics of the plaintiff is actionable is that the focused verbal assault 
mayor may not be extreme and outrageous conduct, absent that conclusion. For 
example, would a single statement by a co-employee be actionable under circum-
stances where the person making the statement makes it out of frustration with the 
job performance of the targeted person? Would the same statement be actionable if 
it arises out of a driving dispute? If it is made by an adult to a child? The variance 
may raise doubts about the wisdom of any expansion of section 46 based on the 
compelled legal conclusion that any bias-motivated epithet is extreme and outra-
geous. 
There may also be constitutional problems with that conclusion. In State v. 
Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Dec. 14, 
1992), the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the day after R.A. V. was decided, held the Wis-
consin "hate crimes" statute unconstitutional because it punished subjective motiva-
tion, something prohibited by the First Amendment. Justice Abrahamson, in dissent, 
would have concluded that the statute was constitutional because the "statute is a 
prohibition on conduct, not on belief or expression. The statute does nothing more 
than assign consequences to invidiously discriminatory acts." Id. at 819 (Abraham-
son, J., dissenting). 
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vated emotional assaults, that the distress suffered by the vic-
tim of the verbal assault is not severe enough. As the 
California Supreme Court suggested over twenty years ago in 
Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 13 it is time to recognize the abusive 
nature of racial epithets and .their impact on persons of color. 
The same may be said of verbal assaults based on other immu-
table characteristics of hate speech victims. 
If there is judicial recognition of the intense psychological 
harm that may occur when abusive epithets are used, there 
should be a correspondingly greater judicial willingness to per-
mit a jury determination of the damages in light of the severity 
of the emotional injury that may result, as reinforced not by 
medical opinions, but rather, by the circumstances surround-
ing the verbal attack. 
Lack of proof that the defendant intended to inflict severe 
emotional distress on the plaintiff may also act as a check on 
expanded recovery. Intent exists where the defendant's pur-
pose is to cause the result, but it also includes cases where the 
defendant knows to a substantial certainty that the result will 
occur. That may be a fact question in many cases involving the 
use of the epithets. Intent may be harder to establish where 
the statement is tossed out as a reflexive action in certain 
settings. 
The application of section 46 to cases involving hate speech 
should not create constitutional problems, absent a collision 
with First Amendment interests established by the Supreme 
Court in the defamation cases. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul 14 
should have no impact on emotional distress claims based on 
hate speech. 
The typical approach to hate speech is to begin with the 
United States Supreme Court precedent carving out certain ar-
eas of unprotected speech, including defamation and obscen-
ity, and, under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,15 "fighting words," 
and, Brandenburg v. Ohio,16 incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tion. Chaplinsky has been the constitutional baseline against 
which hate speech limitations have been measured, including 
the ordinance in issue in R.A. V. 
13. 468 P.2d 216, 219 nA (Cal. 1970). 
14. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
IS. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
16. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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From the perspective of a torts professor, at least two things 
have occurred to me in examining the potential impact of the 
Court's decision in R.A. V. on civil actions for speech that 
causes injury. One is whether the proper comparisons are be-
ing made. The answer to that question raises another: whether 
Chaplinsky is the appropriate constitutional baseline against 
which to measure hate speech limitations. 
While the right to recover for emotional harm that is an off-
shoot of the invasion of other interests protected by tort law is 
permitted, the Restatement establishes that only recently has the 
rule in section 46 "been fully recognized as a separate and dis-
tinct basis of tort liability, without the presence of the elements 
necessary to any other tort, such as assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, trespass to land, or the like."l7 Written in 1965, 
the comments to section 46 note that the law is still developing 
and the "ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined."l8 
In a caveat, the American Law Institute "expresses no opinion 
as to whether there may not be other circumstances under 
which the actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or 
reckless infliction of emotional distress."l9 
The development of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress has generally progressed free from First Amend-
ment interference. As the tort has developed, the courts' 
concerns have not been First Amendment concerns. Early 
concerns over permitting recovery for emotional harm unac-
companied by any underlying tort focused on the difficulty in 
proving the harm, the intangible nature of the harm, and the 
possibility that once the right to recover for emotional distress 
is recognized, there will be no ready means of limiting those 
claims and the law will be forced to deal with trivial and per-
haps fraudulent claims. Those are the same concerns that have 
prevented the undue expansion of the tort to date. That does 
not mean that the First Amendment is inapplicable to inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims, however. 
The development of constitutional restrictions on claims for 
defamation is a good example. The reputational interests pro-
tected by the tort of defamation are subject to limitation in 
cases involving claims by public officials and figures, and by 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. b (1965). 
18. [d. cmt. c. 
19. /d. caveat. 
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private figures, at least where public issues are involved. The 
degree of constitutional protection depends on the importance 
of the state's interest in protecting reputation as balanced 
against the First Amendment interest in promoting speech. 
Public officials and figures who bring defamation claims must 
meet the standards of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,20 while 
private persons must meet the standards established in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc. 21 
In situations where there is no public official or figure in-
volved, and no matter of public concern, the usual common 
law standards apply, permitting recovery without proof of fault 
and without proof of actual damages, or the publisher's knowl-
edge of the falsity of the defamatory statement or substantial 
doubts about the truth of the statement. The important point 
is that there is a balancing of interests that makes the state's 
interest in protecting reputation paramount at a certain point. 
Absent Chaplinsky as the qualifying standard, the issue is why 
the same balancing should not take place in cases involving 
claims of intentionally inflicted emotional injury. 
Tort law recognizes the importance of the interest in emo-
tional tranquility, not as an absolute matter, but as an interest 
to be protected from interference by particularly outrageous 
conduct that causes severe emotional distress. In cases where 
the defendant causes severe emotional distress by picking on a 
peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff, engages in a repeated 
pattern of harassment, or abuses a power relationship, the nec-
essary degree of outrage may be established, justifying recov-
ery if the distress is severe enough. 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does 
not apply in every case involving emotional harm caused by 
words or actions. Concerned about an undue expansion of the 
right to recover for emotional harm, the courts have rigidly 
limited the availability of the tort. To check the use of the tort 
to circumvent other limitations, such as the right to recover for 
breach of contract or the constitutional limitations on defama-
tion actions, the courts have liberally utilized limitations on the 
right to recover for emotional distress to dispose of trivial 
claims as a matter of law, based either on the conclusion that 
the defendant's conduct did not exhibit the necessary degree 
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
21. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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of outrageousness, or because the plaintiff's distress was not 
severe enough, as measured either by physical manifestations 
or medical testimony corroborating the claim of severe emo-
tional distress. 
It should be obvious that even absent constitutional limita-
tions on the right to recover for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, the courts have limited the use of the tort 
by imposing significant restrictions on the right to recover. 
The state interest in preserving the right to recover for emo-
tional distress is, therefore, a limited one, borne out by hun-
dreds of litigated cases, but as is also evidenced by the cases 
where recovery has been allowed, the interest is significant. 
Given the legitimacy of the state's interest in protecting its 
citizens from intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress, 
the issue then becomes whether there is a countervailing con-
stitutional interest that justifies further limitation on the right 
to recover. That was the issue in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. 22 
The plaintiff, Jerry Falwell, a well known minister who com-
mented frequently on public affairs and politics, was the sub-
ject of a parody of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur in 
one of the issues of Hustler Magazine, published by Larry 
Flynt. The advertisement was modeled on actual ads for 
Campari in which celebrities were interviewed about their 
"first times." In the parody, Falwell was chosen as the celeb-
rity. An "interview" of Falwell established that his "first time" 
was "during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother 
in an outhouse." The parody also portrayed Falwell and his 
mother as drunk and immoral. 
Falwell brought suit for libel, invasion of privacy, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. At the close of the evi-
dence, the trial court granted a directed verdict for the 
defendants on the invasion of privacy claim. The jury found 
against the plaintiff on the libel claim, with a specific finding 
that the ad parody could not reasonably be understood as 
describing actual facts about Falwell or actual events in which 
Falwell participated. However, the jury did find for Falwell on 
the emotional distress claim and awarded him $100,000 in 
compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages of 
$50,000 against each defendant. 
22. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment against the de-
fendants, concluding that the actual malice standard in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,23 did not have to be met before 
Falwell could recover.24 The Supreme Court reversed.25 
The Hustler Court noted that the case presented a "novel 
question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State's 
authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress."26 The issue was whether a public figure 
was entitled to recover damages for the emotional harm 
caused by an ad parody which is likely repugnant to most. 
Falwell argued that the state interest in protecting public 
figures from emotional distress justifies denial of First Amend-
ment protection to patently offensive speech that is intended 
to inflict emotional distress, even if the speech could not be 
construed as stating actual facts about the public figure. The 
Court held that it could not. 
Falwell argued that if the defendant's utterance is intended 
to inflict emotional distress, is outrageous, and in fact inflicted 
severe emotional distress, it should be actionable, whether the 
statements are true or false or fact or opinion. The argument 
is that the intent to cause injury is the gravamen of the tort, 
and that the state's interest in preventing emotional harm out-
weighs any First Amendment interest the speaker may have in 
such speech. 
The Court noted: "Generally speaking the law does not re-
gard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which 
should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable 
that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly 
culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently 'outra-
geous.' "27 However, the Court concluded that "while such a 
bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort 
liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amend-
ment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about 
public figures."28 
The history of political commentary includes numerous ex-
amples of the use of caustic caricatures by political cartoons 
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
24. 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
25. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
26. [d. at 49. 
27. [d. at 53. 
28. [d. 
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and satirists,29 making it clear that from the historical point of 
view, "our political discourse would have been considerably 
poorer without them."30 The Court was reluctant to interfere 
with that freedom of political commentary by drawing a line 
that would permit recovery for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by a public figure such as Falwell, because 
of the impact that a standard permitting recovery would have 
on freedom of commentary about public figures and officials: 
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason 
of publications such as the one here at issue without show-
ing in addition that the publication contains a false state-
ment of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with 
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless dis-
regard as to whether or not it was true. This is not merely a 
"blind application of the New York Times standard, ... it re-
flects our considered judgment that such a standard is nec-
essary to give adequate "breathing space" to the freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment. 31 
Given the fact that the ad parody could not reasonably be con-
strued as making a false statement of fact, Falwell was not enti-
tled to recover for libel. The same deficiency precluded 
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.32 
The Court's opinion was limited to claims by public officials 
and figures. Unanswered is the question of what will happen if 
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is 
29. See id. at 53-55. 
30. Id. at 55. 
31. Id. at 56. In Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Minn. 
1985), the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that alleged 
defamatory statements in defendant's publication of a book, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, 
that allegedly defamed the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's involvement as an FBI 
agent in the Wounded Knee incident, were not "so outrageous as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency." Id. at 650. The court's perception of Minnesota law 
was that only in extreme situations will a person's conduct be sufficient to justify a 
finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress, including mutilation of a 
corpse, embalming a body without the permission of the relatives, or threatening a 
school girl with serious consequences unless she confessed to immoral conduct. Id. 
In conclusion, the court stated that it "found no Minnesota case which discusses 
whether allegedly false statements made against a public official may state a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 651. The court held as a 
matter of law that the statements in the case were not "utterly intolerable in a civi-
lized society." Id. 
32. Id. at 56. 
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brought by a private person against either a media or non-me-
dia defendant, whether or not a public issue is involved. 
Absent a claim by a public figure or public official for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of polit-
ical commentary directed toward the official or figure, there is 
arguably no justification for holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits use of the tort. However, the First Amendment base-
line, or a baseline established by state policy, may push the tort 
back further. In cases where the emotional distress claimed by 
an individual is the product of commentary on a matter of pub-
lic concern, it is arguable that even a private person should be 
unable to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as a means of circumventing the First Amendment lim-
itations of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 33 Gertz held that a private 
figure bringing suit against a media defendant for defamation 
must prove fault on the part of the defendant and must prove 
actual damage. Neither term was clearly defined, although 
fault means at least negligence in failing to determine the truth 
or falsity of the matter published, and actual damage means, 
not special damages in the sense of a slander per se claim, but 
that damages awards must be justified by record evidence. 
The damages requirement ensures that damages will not be 
presumed and the fault requirement ensures that states will 
not impose strict liability on publishers of defamatory matter. 
Subsequently, in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,34 the Court 
held that in cases where the publication concerning a private 
person is about a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must 
prove the falsity of the statement.35 In addition, the Court has 
indicated that the justification for Gertz is the public nature of 
the defamatory statement, rather than the status of the 
defendant. 
If Gertz applies and a claimant asserts claims for both defa-
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the 
Court would likely reach the same result as in Hustler. The 
plaintiff would have to prove the falsity of the statement, and 
an inability to do so would preclude recovery for defamation. 
The plaintiff would not be able to circumvent the constitu-
33. 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
34. 475 u.s. 767 (1986). 
35. Id. at 777. 
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tional limitations in such a case by pleading the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 
The Hustler limitations on the right to recover for emotional 
distress should not be applicable in cases where there is no 
public official or figure or where there is no matter of public 
concern. The Hustler limitations, necessary in cases where 
there is satire or other commentary concerning public officials 
or figures, or where there is commentary concerning an issue 
of public concern, are unnecessary where there is focused, 
abusive conduct in the private context. As in the defamation 
cases, where there is no public official or figure, and no public 
issue, the state's right to vindicate reputational interests is cor-
respondingly greater, and any First Amendment concerns 
more remote or nonexistent. The same should be true in cases 
involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
There are additional potential limitations on the right to re-
cover for emotional distress. The tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress may not override state fact/opinion dis-
tinctions, even if not constitutionally compelled,36 and it may 
not override any common law qualified privileges that would 
apply to defamation claims.37 But those limitations should be 
applicable only in cases where the claim for intentional inflic-
tion would in fact circumvent the constitutional or common 
law privileges applicable to speech that is otherwise protected. 
If the severe emotional distress is caused by a communication 
that is otherwise privileged, then the privilege should preclude 
a finding that the speaker's conduct is extreme and outra-
geous. In cases where the commentary exceeds the privilege, 
as it might in cases where the New York Times Co. actual malice 
standard is met, or common law qualified privileges are ex-
ceeded, recovery should be allowed, if the elements of a sec-
tion 46 claim are met. 
Permitting recovery in cases involving focused verbal as-
saults should not run afoul of the First Amendment. In an-
other setting, the Supreme Court in Frisby v. Schultz ,38 
36. Compare Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990) (holding that 
fact/opinion distinction not compelled by the First Amendment) with Diesen v. Hess-
burg, 455 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1990) (holding that fact/opinion distinction compelled 
under Minnesota law). 
37. The existence of a common law qualified privilege is a question oflaw for the 
court. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). 
38. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
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recognized that focused picketing is not protected by the First 
Amendment. Given the parallel harm that is involved in fo-
cused picketing and focused verbal assaults, it is arguable that 
focused verbal assaults are no less worthy of protection than 
the harm caused by focused picketing. 
The Court began its analysis with the proposition that public 
streets and sidewalks are the archetype of the traditional public 
forum, and do not lose that status because they run through a 
residential neighborhood. The ordinance was adopted in re-
sponse to focused picketing by anti-abortion protestors on a 
public street outside the house of a doctor who performed 
abortions.39 The Court accepted the lower court's construc-
tion of the ordinance as content-neutral. The issue was 
whether it was " 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernment interest' and whether it [left] 'open ample alternative 
channels of communication.' "40 
Before analyzing the ordinance, the Court concluded that it 
was subject to a narrowing construction that avoided any con-
stitutional difficulties.41 The Court found that the ordinance 
was "intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and tak-
ing place in front of, a particular residence."42 The picketing 
ban was held to apply only to "focused picketing taking place 
solely in front of a particular residence."43 
As construed, the Court found that the ordinance left open 
ample alternatives for communication and that the ordinance 
served a compelling government interest: 
"The State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquil-
ity, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order 
in a free and civilized society." . .. Our prior decisions have 
often remarked on the unique nature of the home, "the last 
citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick" .... 
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection 
of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we 
expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want 
to hear, ... the home is different. "That we are often 'cap-
tives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to ob-
39. [d. at 480. 
40. [d. at 482 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 
37,45 (1983)). 
41. [d. at 482. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 483. 
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jectionable speech ... does not mean we must be captives 
h " everyw ere. . .. 
Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy 
within their own walls, which the State may legislate to pro-
tect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeat-
edly held that individuals are not required to welcome 
unwanted speech into their own homes and that the govern-
ment may protect this freedom. 44 
The court also concluded that the ordinance was narrowly tai-
lored to protect only "unwilling recipients of the communica-
tions."45 The Court stated: . 
The type of focused picketing prohibited by the Brookfield 
ordinance is fundamentally different from more generally 
directed means of communication that may not be com-
pletely banned in residential areas. . . . Here, in contract, 
the picketing is narrowly directed at the household, not the 
public. The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield or-
dinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to 
the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resi-
dent, and to do so in an especially offensive way. Moreover, 
even if some such picketers have a broader communicative 
purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offen-
sively intrudes on residential privacy. The devastating ef-
fect of targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the 
home is beyond doubt .... 46 
Thus, the Court carefully distinguished situations where the 
message is disseminated to the general public. 
The Court concluded that the number of picketers is irrele-
vant because a solitary picketer could create the same invasion 
of residential privacy. The medium of the expression itself cre-
ates the evil to be avoided-the trapping of the person inside 
the home with no means of avoiding the unwanted communi-
cation-making the size of the group engaging in the picketing 
irrelevant. That construction enabled the Court to conclude 
that the complete ban of focused picketing was narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective. 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted the disruptive nature of 
picketing. He found that the picketing that prompted passage 
of the ordinance in question was intended not only to convey 
44. Id. at 484-85 (citations omitted). 
45. Id. at 485. 
46. Id. at 486. 
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the picketers' opposition to the doctor's practice, but it was 
also "intended to cause him and his family substantial psycho-
logical distress."47 He also stated his view that "picketing for 
the sole purpose of imposing psychological harm on a family in 
the shelter of their home" is not constitutionally protected.48 
The ordinance would have been valid as applied to the kind of 
conduct that prompted the city to enact the ordinance.49 He 
also concluded that the ordinance was overbroad because it 
would overburden other speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 50 
The significance of the decision, for purposes of determin-
ing the constitutional validity of either criminal ordinances or 
statutes intended to punish focused conduct or civil actions in-
tended to compensate persons who have been subjected to fo-
cused conduct is, at its most basic, that the First Amendment 
does not provide constitutional protection for all focused con-
duct, even if there is an expressive element to that conduct. 
That means that where there is no First Amendment protec-
tion, the State may vindicate its interest in protecting its citi-
zens from the harm that results from focused conduct, either 
through the adoption of narrowly drawn legislation that limits 
certain types of focused conduct, or through the application of 
state tort claims to provide compensation for injured victims of 
such conduct. 
The tort approach has the utility of redirecting the constitu-
tional inquiry, permitting an appropriate balancing of in-
terests, but without using Chaplinsky as an immovable 
constitutional baseline. Even if Chaplinsky is used, however, the 
first prong of the fighting words formulation, which focuses on 
words that are likely to cause injury, is receptive to the balanc-
ing approach. The injury prong of Chaplinsky could readily be 
used to establish a less grudging approach to the protection of 
emotional security in the face of hate speech. 
Permitting recovery for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress should not run afoul of the limitations in R.A. V. 
Nothing in the case should preclude recovery for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress based on abusive lan-
47. [d. at 498 (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
48. [d. (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
49. [d. at 498-99 (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
50. [d. at 499 (Stevens. J.. dissenting). 
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guage or behavior, where the language or behavior emphasizes 
the race, gender, religion or sexual orientation or disability of 
the targeted victim. Recognizing that such language or behav-
ior creates particularly egregious harm where it is focused on 
an individual5l should not run afoul of the Court's rationale in 
R.A. V. Unlike Professor Delgado's proposed tort,52 which is 
not content-neutral, section 46 actions are content-neutral. 
Allowing the action in cases where the claim is based on abu-
sive epithets is simply a case-specific application of the general 
civil cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. No special rules are utilized to permit recovery where 
the elements of section 46 are met. Recognition of the harm 
caused by abusive behavior focused on a person because of the 
person's race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, or disability 
is no different than recognizing the peculiar harm that results 
in situations where positions of power are abused, causing per-
sons in subordinate positions severe emotional distress, or 
where one person exploits a susceptibility of another, causing 
that person severe emotional distress. Given the content-neu-
tral basis for emotional distress actions, it should be unneces-
sary to fit the claim within one of the exceptions established by 
Justice Scalia. 
In the concurring opinions in R.A. V., Justices White and Ste-
vens appear to add some life to the first prong of Chaplinsky. 
While Justice White notes that generalized reactions such as 
"anger, alarm or resentment" are insufficient to divest expres-
sion of its constitutional protection, 53 and that hostile activity 
such as the burning of a cross at a political rally would proba-
bly be protected expression, he also notes that in that context, 
"the cross burning could not be characterized as a 'direct per-
sonal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs,' to which the 
fighting words doctrine ... applies."54 Conversely, Justice 
White also notes that offensive speech may be subject to regu-
lation when it intrudes upon a "captive audience,"55 or when it 
51. See Richard Delgado, supra note 8; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
52. See supra note 8. 
53. 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, lJ., concurring). 
54. /d. at 2553 n.4 (Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens,lJ., concurring) (citing Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,409 (1989)). . 
55. /d. at 2560, n.l3 (Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, lJ., concurring) (citing 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 
726, 748-49 (1978)). 
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merges into conduct. 56 
In addition, Justice Stevens states: 
Petitioner is free to bum a cross to announce a rally or to 
express his views about racial supremacy, he may do so on 
private property or public land, at day or at night, so long 
as the burning is not so threatening and so directed at an 
individual as to 'by its very [execution] inflict injury.' Such 
a limited proscription scarcely offends the First 
Amendment.57 
999 
Conversely, where there is focused expression, there should 
be no constitutional protection for that expression, when the 
person engaging in the conduct or communication intends to 
inflict severe emotional distress on the victim. 
A final note: by suggesting a tort approach to the problem of 
hate speech causing severe emotional injury, I do not mean to 
suggest that the civil remedy should be the only remedy for 
hate speech. It should not. It most certainly is not likely to be 
the most effective remedy. But at the very least, it should open 
up for consideration the possibility of a less grudging ap-
proach to claims for hate speech which meets the elements of 
section 46 emotional distress. 
56. [d. (Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, lJ., concurring) (citing United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968». 
57. [d. at 2571 (White, Blackmun,lJ., concurring). In footnote 8,Justice Stevens 
in effect makes the analogy of an expressive or verbal fist, relying on the argument 
made by the City of St. Paul: 
Finally, we ask the Court to reflect on the 'content' of the 'expressive con-
duct' represented by a 'burning cross.' It is no less than the first step in an 
act of racial violence. It was and unfortunately still is the equivalent of[the] 
waving of a knife before the thrust, the pointing of a gun before it is fired, 
the lighting of the match before the arson, the hanging of the noose before 
the lynching. It is not a political statement, or even a cowardly statement of 
hatred. It is the first step in an act of assault. It can be no more protected 
than holding a gun to a victim['s] head. It is perhaps the ultimate expres-
sion of 'fighting words.' 
[d. at 2569-70 (citing Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at C-6, R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992». 
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